

**AMERICAN AND LEBANESE COLLEGE STUDENTS' RESPONSES TO THE
EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.**
The relation of hopes and fears to the psychology of group positions

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RESUMEN

Universitarios americanos y libaneses manifestaron sus esperanzas y miedos por el futuro en los meses posteriores a los ataques terroristas del 11-9-2001. En las esperanzas particulares y los miedos entre americanos y libaneses, los resultados muestran la importancia de las orientaciones político-psicológicas arraigadas como la empatía, la identificación con los grupos poderosos o los de bajo poder, la orientación de la dominación social y el autoritarismo de derechas. Los de baja orientación en la dominación social y los que se identifican con los grupos de menos poder en ambas muestras temen la violencia entre grupos. Sin embargo, mientras que los americanos con alto autoritarismo temen la pérdida de poder de los EE.UU., los libaneses con baja orientación en la dominación social esperan un descenso del predominio de los EE.UU. Pensamos que los estudios psicológicos de las respuestas a acontecimientos políticos relevantes, incluso traumáticos, se basan en las posiciones psicológicas del grupo.

ABSTRACT

American and Lebanese college students reported their hopes and fears for the future in the months following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. of September 11, 2001. Results illustrated the importance of robust political-psychological orientations, including empathy, identification with powerful or powerless groups, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism, in predicting particular hopes and fears among both Americans and Lebanese. Fear of intergroup violence was felt especially by those low on social dominance orientation and who identify with low power groups in both samples. However, whereas Americans high on authoritarianism feared a loss of U.S. predominance, Lebanese low on social dominance orientation hoped for a loss of U.S. predominance. We argue that psychological studies of responses to significant political events, even traumatic ones, are informed by psychological group positions.

Comentario: Cortado el resumen.

Key words: social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, empathy, terrorist attacks

People who were proximal to the attacks of September 11, 2001 had to grapple with evident threats of unknown magnitude and origin, and then with the aftermath of emergency and tragedy. In New York City, for example, people faced the problems of getting out of subways, getting home through blocked routes without mass transportation, finding groceries without functioning ATM machines, finding lighting and battery-operated radios, explaining the falling ashes and papers to their children, and loca-

ting loved ones (numerous anonymous personal communications, fall, 2001). Americans who experienced the events of September 11th from more distance were beset with less immediate practical concerns, but were universally shocked and upset. Regional and national studies have substantiated the psychological stress (Schuster et al., 2001), trauma (Silver Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & Gil-Rivas, 2002) and fear (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Prøvost, 2002) Americans experienced. Viewing Americans' reactions to these events simply as collective trauma, which is quite common, fails to take into account the feeling held by many Americans had that this event was unlike any other in history, and that it might well presage a different future than expected. These events led at least some Americans to reconsider their assumptions about what America represents, its position in the world, and what its future holds.

The present research therefore examined the fears and hopes excited by the events of September 11th. As these attacks can be viewed as part of a political power struggle between relatively dominant nations and privileged members of relatively powerless nations (see Mandel, 2002; Sidanius, Henry, Levin, & Pratto, in press), they are not just a psychological trauma, but a natural laboratory for studying the political psychology of intergroup violence. The present research examined whether important psychopolitical variables: right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and psychological affiliation with groups predicted the kinds of hopes and fears American college students experienced. To test whether the factors that shaped Americans' reactions to the events of September 11th, 2001 generalize to substantially different political contexts, we conducted a comparable study of Lebanese college students.

Psycho-Political Variables

The psycho-political variables we examined come from three main theories of prejudice and intergroup relations: Authoritarian Personality Theory (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1981), Social Identity Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Social Dominance Theory (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). All three of these theories are social-psychological in nature, and as such, assume that social psychological responses are a joint product of the person in the social situation and the social situation in the person. In particular, authoritarian personality theory views authoritarian prejudice against subordinate groups to be motivated by anxiety over whether one has approval from authorities, with punitive beliefs imparted through religious socialization (e.g., Hunsberger, 1996) and other cultural ideologies (e.g., Duckitt, Wegner, di-

Plessis, & Birum, 2002). Authoritarian personality suggests examining authoritarianism and its relation to threat and anxiety. Various debates over the exact motivation for outgroup prejudice or ingroup favoritism abound in social identity theory and its offspring, but proximally, social identity theory views intergroup prejudice and discrimination as stemming from identification with one's ingroups (e.g., Brewer, 1979) or from failure to identify with outgroups (e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996). Hence, social identity theory prioritizes measuring psychological affiliations with groups, particularly in contexts where social group boundaries are salient. Social dominance theory has emphasized that one's group's power and cultural ideologies orient individuals to favor or disfavor social dominance. Building in part on social identity theory, social dominance theory has emphasized the importance of psychological group positions in group identity processes, for example, identification and sympathy with more powerful groups or with less powerful groups. We briefly summarize research findings using measures derived from these theories in predicting political reactions.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Altemeyer's (1981) right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale is a robust predictor of liberal-conservative political party identification, of prejudice against outgroups such as other races, religious minorities, immigrants, homosexuals, in a variety of nations, languages, and religious groups (e.g., Duckitt et al, 2002; Hunsberger, 1996; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993; Whitley & Lee, 2000; Wagner, van Dijk, & Zick, 2001).

Identification with groups. One's psychological identification with social groups is a robust predictor of intergroup prejudice and group-relevant ideologies in naturally-occurring situations of intergroup conflict (e.g., Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Mercer & Cairns, 1981; Moore & Aweiss, 2002). Social dominance theory has pointed out that ingroup identification is often asymmetrical (e.g., Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Mercer & Cairns, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Ch. 9) with respect to outgroup prejudice, and that the power of groups must be considered. In the present studies, we assessed identification with a salient ingroup and also sympathy with or identification with an outgroup differing in power than the ingroup.

Social Dominance Orientation. SDO is defined as one's generalized desire for group dominance as opposed to intergroup equality. SDO can be reliably measured, is stable over time, and is generally higher among members of high power groups (e.g., Whites, men, straight people) than among low power groups (e.g., Blacks, women, gay and lesbian people; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999,

Chapter 3). SDO is general in that it orients people to favor ideologies that legitimize inequality for a wide variety of groups, such as anti-Black racism, anti-Arab racism, numerous forms of sexism, meritocracy, chauvinism, nationalism (e.g., Duckitt et al., 2002; Pratto et al., 1994; van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002; Whitley & Lee, 2000; Wagner et al., 2001), and to predict people's attitudes toward unfolding political events in prospective studies (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994).

Empathy. People high on SDO are more tough-minded and cruel than people low on SDO (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt et al., 2002). Concern for other people's well-being, in contrast, should mitigate intergroup prejudice and support for outgroup violence. Indeed, for such reasons Pratto et al. (1994) expected empathy—in particular, Davis's (1983) concern for others subscale—to correlate negative with SDO. As these two variables only correlate about $r = -.30$, empathy may predict other variance not accounted for by SDO, so we assessed empathy in Study 1.

Study 1: American college students' hopes and fears following September 11, 2001

Study 1 tested the relation of American college students' hopes and fears following the events of September 11th to important psycho-political variables. Data were collected about one month after September 11, 2001. Although this might make the study seem retrospective, we would argue that the impact of the events of September 11th and their unfolding aftermath (including but not limited to anthrax dissemination by mail, the beginning of a war in Afghanistan, a debate over reorganization of the federal government, excavation of the World Trade Center, etc.) was concurrent with data collection. Because Study 1 used a convenience sample, we were able to assess measures in detail. In deciding whether such a study would be harmful to participants who had already potentially been traumatized, we relied on psychological studies indicating that writing about upsetting emotional experiences helps people heal (e.g., Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002). The last set of questions participants completed concerned their hopes for the future. Debriefing revealed no particular upset about the study among participants.

Method

Participants

Participants were 283 undergraduate students at the University of Connecticut who volunteered to participate in a study called "Reactions to the events of September 11th" on October 16, 2001, little more than a week after the U.S. began bombing Afghanistan on October 8, 2001. They in-

cluded 61 men, 221 women, and 1 who did not identify gender, 236 European-Americans, 8 African-Americans, 14 Asian-Americans, 8 Hispanics, 8 multiracial Americans, and 9 foreigners, 151 Catholics, 22 Protestants, 1 Muslim, 5 Hindus, 19 Jews, 12 with no religion, and 45 with various other religions. On the whole, participants had secondary links to the attacks of September 11th. Their university is in central rural Connecticut, about a three hour trip to New York City. Over 86% had been to New York City and 75% had been to Washington, DC. Only 13% knew someone personally who was killed or injured but 56% knew someone who knew someone killed or injured.

Measures

RWA. Right-wing authoritarianism was measured using Altemeyer's (1981) 30-item scale ($\alpha = .78$). Scores did not change as a function of order condition ($M = 3.89$), $F < 1$. Men were reliably higher on RWA ($M = 4.08$) than women ($M = 3.82$), $F(1, 277) = 6.91$, $p = .009$, $\eta^2 = .02$.

SDO. Social dominance orientation was measured using the 16-item scale (Pratto et al., 1994). It was internally reliable, $\alpha = .87$, and scores did not change as a function of order condition ($M = 2.60$), $p = .20$. Men were reliably higher on SDO ($M = 2.91$) than women ($M = 2.52$), $F(1, 278) = 8.25$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .03$. SDO correlated slightly with RWA, $r = .13$, $p < .03$.

Group identification. To measure positive attachment to the most relevant ingroup in light of the attacks of September 11, we used Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) 12-item patriotism scale ($\alpha = .76$). Patriotism correlated slightly with RWA, $r = .14$, $p < .05$, but not with SDO nor gender. As the U.S. is a higher power nation, to measure identification with low power groups, we averaged one item from the modern racism scale (McConahay, 1986), "It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in America," with another item in the political attitudes section, "I can understand how people in other parts of the world could be angry with the U.S." ($\alpha = .29$). This measure correlated negatively with SDO, $r = -.19$, $p < .001$, RWA, $r = -.24$, $p < .001$, and patriotism, $r = -.19$, $p < .002$.

Empathy. Two subscales from Davis (1983) empathy scale were administered. Our predictions concerned the Concern for Others subscale ($\alpha = .74$) but we included the fantasy subscale as well for discriminant validity ($\alpha = .79$). Women ($M = 4.11$) were reliably higher on concern for others than men ($M = 3.69$), $F(1, 279) = 22.69$, $\eta^2 = .075$. Concern for others correlated positively with RWA, $r = .17$, $p < .01$, negatively with SDO, $r = -.29$,

$p < .01$, but not with identity with low-power groups, $r = .07$ or patriotism, $r = .11$, $p < .07$. The fantasy scale correlated with concern for others, $r = .23$, $p < .001$, but was not reliably related to any of psycho-political measures reported herein and is not discussed further.

Fears and Hopes. Directions for a page labeled “Fears for the Future” read, “Since the events of September 11, many people have begun to fear possible events of the future. Please take a moment to think about any of the fears you might have experienced yourself. For each potential event listed below, circle the number on the scale that best represents how much you have feared the event coming to pass.” Scale was labeled 1 (have not feared) 2 (mild fear) 3 (moderate fear) 4 (high fear) 5 (intense fear). Following the 31 fear items, a new page labeled “Hopes for the Future” instructed, “The events of September 11 open the possibility that many things in the world could be changed in the future. Considering new possibilities, what are your best hopes for the future? For each potential event listed below, circle the number on the scale that best represents how much you wish that event would come to pass.” Scale was labeled 1 (do not hope for) 2 (slight hope) 3 (moderate hope) 4 (big hope) 5 (major hope) and there were 24 items. Hopes and fears included personal, national, and international concerns from across the political spectrum.

Results

Fears

Principle components analysis of the fears ratings suggested there were four factors, so the 4-factor solution with varimax rotation was computed. Items, their loadings on each factor, and percent of variance explained by each factor are shown in Table 1. The first factor captures fears of violence, including war and terrorism, in many of the volatile regions of the world. As this factor pertains to several different groups, it reflects an inclusive concern about intergroup violence rather than a group-biased one. It also includes 3 items indicating that participants felt their political opinions would be non-consensual and disapproved, suggesting that participants with these fears felt they were in the minority. The second fear factor centers around possible loss of U.S. predominance. The third factor concerns insecurity, both fear of terrorist attacks against the U.S. and other nations, and casualties due to war or to terrorism. Unlike the first factor, the third factor includes fears for the safety of those one knows personally. The fourth factor has few items: last factors in PCA necessarily account for variance not shared by previous factors and so may not have coherent

themes. However, this factor seems to reflect fear of loss of personal freedoms.

To assess the relative extent participants feared these groups of fears, we averaged the items with highest ratings on the factors and conducted a repeated measures ANOVA on the four averages. Ratings differed, $F(3, 147) = 78.25, p < .001, \eta^2 = .62$. Post-hoc tests ($p < .05$) showed most fear of insecurity ($M = 3.68$), followed by fears of loss of U.S. dominance ($M = 2.86$) and loss of personal freedom ($M = 2.88$), followed by fear of inter-group violence ($M = 2.58$).

Factor:	1	2	3	4
Percent variance associated with factor	18.5	14.5	10.9	6.5
Massive death toll among Afghan refugees	.82			
Afghan civilians being killed by US action	.70			
Civil war engulfing Afghanistan for many years to come	.70			
Another war breaking out on the Arabian Peninsula	.68			
An increase in violence between Israelis and Palestinians	.65			
War will break out between nuclear powers in central Asia	.62			
Pressure from the US and Islamic leaders will destabilize nuclear powers in central Asia	.60			
Hate crimes against innocent Americans of Arab or Middle Eastern descent	.57			.34
Israel being further endangered due to reduced support from the US	.55	.41		
Others will dislike my political opinions	.52	.38	-.40	
A war between Muslim and Christian nations	.50			
Civil liberties like freedom of speech and freedom of association being curtailed in the US	.46	.46		
Hate crimes or discrimination against me because I strike someone as "suspicious"	.42	.41		
New safety precautions against terrorism seriously harming the US economy		.72		
The US not getting the respect it deserves		.70		
U.S. position in the world is slipping		.70		
That the US will not come out on top		.64	.45	
New safety precautions against terrorism leading to worldwide recession		.60		
That Americans peace activists will undermine our military's efforts to right this problem		.57		
Decrease in living standards among Americans who are already poor		.47		.41
That the enemy will use disunity among Americans to their advantage	.37	.43		
Gasoline prices will sky-rocket	.26	.42	.26	

Future terrorist attacks against the US			.79	
I or someone I know will be killed or injured in a future terrorist attack			.75	
I or someone I know being called to war			.57	
A truly world-wide war involving North America, Africa, Europe and central Asia		.57		
Further terrorist attacks against other nations	.45		.51	
US's response to these attacks will produce more terrorists who hate the US	.34		.47	
Not being able to travel as much in the future as I would like				.76
My financial future being less secure than I had assumed it would be		.49		.48
My privacy being violated by government officials in the name of cracking Down on terrorism				.56
Note. Scale ranged from 1 (have not feared) to 5 (intense fear). Principle components loadings using varimax rotation are shown. Loadings not shown were less than 40% of the highest loading shown.				

Hopes

Scree plots of principle components analysis of the hopes ratings suggested there were four factors, so the 4-factor solution with varimax rotation was computed. Items, their loadings on each factor, and percent of variance explained by each factor are shown in Table 2. The first factor includes three themes: effective punishment of the attackers, freedom from fear, and unity among Americans. The second factor reflects hopes for a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for humility in U.S. foreign policy. The third factor seems to reflect a wish that the U.S. be righted or restored. The fourth factor reflects a wish for change in U.S. foreign alliances. Averages of items loading highest on each factor were computed and subjected to repeated measures ANOVA, $F(3, 123) = 54.83$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .57$. Post hoc tests showed that the hope for unity and safety was predominant ($M=4.03$), followed by hope for international peace ($M = 3.54$), followed by hopes for restoration ($M = 3.05$) and a new foreign policy ($M = 2.94$).

Table 2
Items and factor loadings for hopes for the future, US Sample 1.

Factor:	1	2	3	4
Percent variance associated with factor	22.1	16.2	8.7	8.2
That other countries would come to the aid of the US in its military endeavors	.78			
That my family and I would be safe from attack	.72			
That the US would eliminate the possibility of further terrorist attacks on our nation.	.72			

That all those responsible for the attacks of Sept 11 would be killed	.68			
That all those responsible for the attacks of Sept 11 would be punished by law	.64			
That my family and I would be free from fear and worry	.64			
That other nations would come to the aid of the US with intelligence to track down terrorists	.64			
That Americans would stop criticizing their own country	.63			
That the US response to this event will deter other would-be terrorists	.62			
That I will do something with my life that will make the world a better place	.56	.39		
That racists and religious fanatics within the US would see the danger of their ways	.45	.42		
That Americans would be more ready to recognize each other as Americans, regardless of race	.45	.42		
That Americans would recognize that US policy is not necessarily popular abroad	.78			
That the Palestinians would gain statehood in peace alongside Israel		.77		
That Americans will recognize that other people in the world suffer violence and needless death		.76		
That Israel and Palestinians would make peace		.76		
That the US would eliminate the possibility of further terrorist attacks on other nations		.59		
That people would see that pacifism is irrational and dangerous			.76	
That our country would return to proper worship of God and lawfulness			.78	
The President Bush would see that we can't afford to go it alone and would sign international treaties			.55	
That the US would stop supporting repressive regimes abroad				.75
That the US would withdraw from other countries				.73
That the US would reduce foreign aid.				.61
That the US would become more supportive of moderate leaders in Muslim countries			.56	
Note. Scale ranged from 1 (do not hope for event) to 5 (major hope for the future). Principle components loadings using varimax rotation are shown. Loadings not shown were less than 40% of the highest loading shown.				

Predictors of Fears and Hopes

Due to the varimax rotation, each fear and hope factor score was independent. To test what political-psychological variables predicted each one, we regressed concern for others, SDO, RWA, patriotism, and identification with low-power groups on each factor score. Results are shown in Table 3.

The first fear factor, of intergroup violence, was experienced most strongly by those low on SDO, and marginally by those who identified with low power groups. It was unrelated to empathy or authoritarianism ($r = .15$). This effect bespeaks the concern of those low on SDO for people in subordinate groups, and the unconcern that people high on SDO have for the suffering of those in outgroups (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et al, 1994). The second fear factor, loss of U.S. predominance, was felt most by those high on authoritarianism. The third fear factor, for possible future victims of terrorism and violence including those one knows, was experienced especially by those high on concern for others. This factor score also correlated negatively with SDO, $r = -.19$, $p < .05$, but the regression showed that this relation was redundant with the relation with empathy. It appears that this level of personal concern corresponds more to the general interpersonal form of empathy measured, whereas concern for subordinate groups in danger (fear factor 1) corresponds to those low on SDO. The fourth factor, fear of loss of personal freedoms, was consensual across all psychopolitical measures; it correlated reliably with none of them.

Table 3
Regression results of concern for others, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, identification with low-power groups, and patriotism predicting fear and hope factor scores, U.S. Sample 1.

Predictor	Dependent Variable							
	Fear-1 Intergroup Violence		Fear-2 Loss of U.S. Predominance		Fear-3 Insecurity		Fear-4 Loss of Personal Freedoms	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
Concern for others	.08	.83	-.11	-1.11	.22	2.17**	-.02	-.22
SDO	-.25	-2.56***	.12	1.23	-.14	-1.36	.02	.18
RWA	-.10	-.94	.19	1.85*	.07	.71	.10	.95
Identification with subordinate groups	.19	1.85*	.06	.59	-.01	-.10	.02	.14
Patriotism	.02	.22	.14	1.29	.05	.49	-.001	-.01
Predictor	Hope-1 Unity, safety		Hope-2 International Peace		Hope-3 Restoration		Hope-4 New US foreign policy	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	Concern for others	-.08	-.77	.25	2.53***	.26	2.68***	.12
SDO	-.03	-.31	-.16	-1.59*	.19	1.92*	.22	1.95*
RWA	.19	1.71*	-.10	-.97	.30	3.04***	-.04	-.35
Identification with subordinate groups	.04	.37	.26	2.57***	-.20	-2.00**	-.06	-.54
Patriotism	.13	1.14	-.05	-.45	-.10	-1.01	-.08	-.68

Note. Standardized regression coefficients (β) shown. *df* for regressions on Hope factor scores = 92. *df* for regressions on Fear factor scores = 100. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$.

The first hope factor reflected three themes (punitiveness, internal unity, and freedom from anxiety) that have long been theorized to be part of the authoritarian personality syndrome; indeed, these hopes were held more by those high on authoritarianism, $r = .20$, $p = .05$, and did not correlate with any other measure. The second factor reflected hope for more peaceful international relations, and was held especially by those high on concern

concern for others and those sympathetic with low power groups. This factor correlated negatively with SDO, $r = -.24$, $p < .01$, but the regression showed that this relation was redundant with empathy and sympathy with low power groups. Regression showed that hope for restoration, the third factor, was higher among those high on concern for others, RWA, and lower for those identified with low power groups. The regression yielded only a marginal relation to SDO, which was correlated $r = .19$, $p < .05$. The fourth factor, hope that the U.S. would change its foreign alliances, was particularly experienced by those high on SDO, and did not correlate reliably with the other variables.

Discussion

We found that the predominant fear of people low on SDO was that people in a variety of vulnerable groups world-wide would suffer violence due to war or to terrorist violence. One of the main differences between people low and high on SDO is how much they care about the suffering of other people, especially those in outgroups. The fourth hope factor, a change in U.S. foreign policy, was held by those high on SDO, and we suppose it comes from practical rather than from principled concerns, as the factor includes prescriptions held by progressives, isolationists, moderates, and conservatives.

In contrast to people high on SDO, people high on RWA expressed fear that the U.S. would lose its predominance. One important difference between those high on SDO and those high on RWA appears to be that high SDO people are relatively confident in their ingroup's dominance, whereas high RWA people have anxiety over their group's position. Prior national studies of the U.S. have shown that people high on authoritarianism tend to perceive threat more readily than people lower on authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), and experimental studies show that threat can increase RWA (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). The first hope factor especially endorsed by those high on RWA included the traditional anxiety-restoration dynamic postulated by authoritarian theory (Adorno et al., 1950): to punish the attackers of one's group, to have ingroup unity, and to be free from fear. If there was a fear or form of anxiety held more by high SDO people than by others, we did not measure it. Those high on authoritarianism also hoped that their country would somehow be made right.

Psychological affiliation with others was expected to affect people's responses to events, including political events, that influence other people. The present results mandate more attention to how such affiliation is theorized and measured. Davis' (1983) concern for others subscale explained

variance in political beliefs and emotions not completely accounted for by SDO or RWA. Highly empathic people expressed the most fear that people would be killed due to more terrorism or war, especially those they know personally, and wished for restoration. Where they differed markedly from people high on RWA is in hoping for more peaceful international relations. People high in empathy may be less sensitive to the *intergroup* aspects of violence than people low on SDO, as empathy did not predict fear factor 1, their concerns correspond to the same wish for peace as those identified with low-power groups (hope factor 2). Ingroup identification in the form of patriotism did not correlate with any of the hopes and fears measured, perhaps because love of country was unquestionable at the time. Thus, outgroup affiliation among powerful group members is an important psychopolitical factor. It would be useful to replicate whether these separate ways of measuring psychological affiliations with outgroup are distinct.

The narrow nature of the sample used in Study 1: young, single, reasonably affluent college students newly away from their families may make one hesitant to generalize from the sample to other Americans. As stated above, the purpose of Study 1 was to explore predominant orientations towards the future and their relation to stable and robust psychopolitical variables. In understanding the relation among those variables, however, the sample in Study 1 is narrow in a more theoretically important way: it examines people whose nation dominates the world, who had been unusually safe from external terrorist or nationalistic attacks, and who, at least until September 11, 2001, could have a hand in international conflicts while living largely outside them. As social dominance theory emphasizes that psychological orientations toward intergroup relations differ among low-power groups than high-power groups, it is important to examine the relation of the psychopolitical variables in a different political context.

Study 2:

Hopes and fears for the future among Lebanese college students

Study 2 examined similar measures among Lebanese college students as did Study 1. Participants in Study 2, then, live in a fairly low-power nation (United Nations Development Program, 2002) with a far different recent history of terrorism and war. In recent decades, Lebanon experienced civil wars that are linked to regional and indeed global conflicts, and has housed and been victimized by terrorist groups and by nations fighting such groups. Lebanon is literally and culturally at the cross-roads of East and West, and as such has a diverse population in which numerous group identities, including religious, ethnic, national, and *cultural* (Arab/Western) are

up for grabs. Study 2 therefore serves as an important test of how identification with ingroups and outgroups of differing power complement well-known psycho-political variables in predicting hopes and fears.

Method

Participants

Invitations to participate in the study along with questionnaires were distributed to a random sample of 596 out of 5808 undergraduate and graduate student mailboxes at the American University of Beirut in November, 2001. Responses were collected anonymously and 145 questionnaires were returned. As the teaching language of this university is English and students must pass an English proficiency exam to gain admission, instructions and measures were written in English. The instructions and measures reflected a parallel but shorter set of items than that used for Sample 1. We collected data from a smaller U.S. sample during the same time period as Sample 2. Because that sample showed similar results as Sample 1, we attribute differences between Samples 1 and 2 to the different socio-political situations of the participants rather than to the particular time period in which measures were assessed. Sample 2 included 67 men and 78 women. Seventy-six identified themselves with a Muslim sect and 64 with a Christian sect.

Measures

RWA. We selected and slightly modified 20 of the 30 RWA items of Altemeyer (1981), omitting those inappropriate for the Lebanese religious and political context. This scale was internally reliable ($\alpha = .81$) and did not differ by major religious division (Muslim, Christian) or gender, $p > .15$.

SDO. The 16-item SDO scale ($\alpha = .83$) was internally reliable. Christians were reliably higher on SDO ($M = 2.80$) than Muslims ($M = 2.39$), $F(1, 122) = 4.26$, $p < .04$, reflecting group status differences, but men and women did not differ reliably, $p > .26$. SDO correlated with RWA, $r = .22$, $p < .01$.

Religion and religious identification. We grouped the various Muslim sects and Christian sects to form a contrast coded religion variable with Muslims coded -1 and Christians coded 1. Degree of religious identification was the mean of ratings to 6 questions: How strongly do you identify with your religion? How close do you feel to other members of your religious community? How much religious education have you had? How strong are your religious beliefs? How often do you think of yourself as a member of your religious community? How important is your religious identity to you? ($\alpha = .88$). Religious identification correlated with RWA, $r =$

.56, $p < .01$, but not with identification with the West, $r = -.09$, or SDO, $r = .09$.

Identification with the West. This identification variable was the mean of ratings of two questions: "How close do you feel to the West? How strongly do you identify with the West?" which were both rated from 1 to 7 ($\alpha = .87$). Identification with the West was not correlated with RWA, $r = -.05$, with religious identification, $r = -.09$, but did correlate with SDO, $r = .18$, $p < .05$. This helps confirm the thesis that for Lebanese, identification with the West means identifying with a higher-power group.

Hopes and Fears. The hopes and fears for the future measures had similar instructions and items as in Sample 1, except that some items were omitted because we felt they were redundant and others because they would be too offensive for Lebanese. Some additional measures that we felt were theoretically interesting and culturally appropriate for Lebanese but not for Americans were also included.

Results

Fears

Principle components analysis of the fears ratings suggested there were three or four factors. The 3-factor solution with varimax rotation yielded more distinct factors and so that solution and factor scores were retained. Items, their loadings on each factor, and percent of variance explained by each factor are shown in Table 4. The first factor reflects fear of intergroup violence. The second factor reflected fear of war and terrorism involving the Arab and Muslim nations, and unlike the first factor included two items directly relevant to the participants: fear of political instability in Lebanon and fear that the participant or someone known by the participant would be killed due to terrorism. The third factor included several forms of insecurity over the future but included both international and personal concerns.

Factor	1	2	3
Percent of variance associated with factor	19.3	15.7	12.7
<i>Item</i>	<i>Loadings on factors</i>		
A massive death toll among Afghan refugees	.80		
Afghan civilians being killed by U.S. action	.73		
More U.S. aid to Israel	.73		
Less international support for a Palestinian state	.68		
Civil war engulfing Afghanistan for many years to come	.66		
An increase in violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians	.55		

Pressure from the U.S. and Islamic leaders will create political instability in central Asia	.51		.29
A truly world-wide war involving North America, Africa, Europe, & central Asia		.85	
War will break out between nuclear powers in central Asia		.74	
A war between Western and Middle Eastern nations		.65	
Another war breaking out on the Arabian peninsula		.64	
Political instability in Lebanon between the Christians, Muslims, and Druze		.43	.37
I or someone I know will be killed or injured in a future terrorist attack		.45	.31
Further terrorist attacks against nations other than the U.S.			.70
Further terrorist attack against the U.S.			.70
My financial future being less secure than I had assumed it would be			.61
Not being able to travel in the future as much as I would like			.55
New safety precautions against terrorism leading to world-wide recession			.46
Note Ratings were made from 1 (have not feared) to 5 (intense fear). Principle components loadings using varimax rotation are shown. Loadings not shown were less than 40% of the highest loading shown.			

As in Study 1, we computed averages of the highest loading items for each factor to compare their magnitudes with repeated measures ANOVA. Fears differed, $F(2, 136) = 23.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .26$. Post hoc tests showed that fear of intergroup violence ($M = 3.40$) was predominant, followed by insecurity ($M = 3.08$), followed by fear of war and terrorism ($M = 2.74$).

Hopes

Principle components analysis of the hopes ratings suggested three factors, so the varimax rotation and scores were retained (see items and loadings in Table 5). The first factor might be labeled a hope for American humility on the international scene. The second factor reflected hope for a resolution of the September 11th attacks including punishment, international cooperation, and an end to such terrorism against all. The third factor primarily reflects a wish for peace between Israel and Palestine and Palestinian statehood, but also includes the wish to be free of anxiety and an end to U.S. support for repressive regimes. Repeated measures ANOVA on the average highest loading items for each factor showed differences, $F(2, 130) = 20.79, p < .001, \eta^2 = .24$. Post-hoc tests showed that the hopes for an end to terrorism ($M = 4.28$) and for Israeli-Palestinian peace ($M = 4.19$) were stronger than the hope for U.S. humility ($M = 3.77$), which nonetheless was not low.

Factor	1	2	3
Percent of variance associated with factor	22.7	20.5	13.4
<i>Item</i>	<i>Loadings on factors</i>		
Americans will recognize that other people in the world suffer violence and needless death	.83		
Americans realize that U.S. policy is unpopular abroad	.83		
That other nations would criticize the U.S. for its harmful policies	.79		
That the U.S. would become more supportive of moderate leaders in Muslim countries	.51		
That the Palestinians would gain statehood	.49		
That the U.S. would become more tolerant of religious leaders in Muslim countries, like the Taliban in Afghanistan	.48		
That there would be no further terrorist attacks on the U.S.		.84	
That all those responsible for the attacks of September 11 will be punished		.74	
That other nations would come to the aid of the U.S. with intelligence to track down terrorists		.71	
That there would be no further terrorist attacks on nations other than the U.S.		.70	
That I will do something with my life that will make the world a better place	.43	.46	
That all those responsible for the attacks of September 11 would receive the rewards they deserve for their heroism		-.55	.68
That the Israelis and the Palestinians would make peace			.68
That the Palestinians would gain statehood			.64
That my family and I would be free from fear and worry			.58
That the U.S. would stop supporting repressive regimes abroad	.54		.57
<i>Note</i> Ratings were made from 1 (do not hope) to 5 (major hope). Principle components loadings using varimax rotation are shown. Loadings not shown were less than 40% of the highest loading shown.			

Predictors of Fears and Hopes

We regressed each fear and hope factor score on a variety of psychological measures including SDO, RWA, identification with the West, religious group (Muslim versus Christian), and degree of religious identification. In addition, because we have found the interaction between religious group and degree of religious identification to relate to attributions for the attacks of September 11 (Sidanius et al., in press) and support for terrorist organizations in this sample (Levin, Henry, Pratto, & Sidanius, in press), we included this interaction term, here called religious divergence. It indexes the extent to which extremely identified Muslims differ from extremely identified Christians. The zero-order correlations between the factor scores and predictor scores and regression results are shown in Table 6.

Table 6
Correlations of social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, identification with the West, religion, religious identification, and religious divergence with fear and hope factor scores, and regression results, Lebanese Sample 2.

Predictor	Dependent Variable								
	Fear-1 Intergroup Violence			Fear-2 More war			Fear-3 Insecurity		
	r	β	t	r	β	t	r	β	t
Identification with West	-.27***	-.11	-1.20	-.04	-.02	-.17	.30****	.23	2.36**
SDO	-.38***	-.31	-3.59****	-.07	-.12	-1.19	.08	.005	.05
RWA	.002	.06	.57	.07	.04	.28	-.08	.01	.09
Muslims vs. Christians	-.35***	.34	1.29	.07	-.06	-.18	-.26***	-.45	-1.53
Religious identification	-.07	-.10	-.91	.14	.11	.87	-.03	.004	.03
Religious divergence	-.41***	-.89	-2.36**	.08	.28	.64	.31**	.88	2.14**
Predictor	Hope-1 U.S. Humility			Hope-2 End to terrorism			Hope-3 Is-Pal Peace		
	r	β	t	r	β	t	r	β	t
	Identification with West	-.32***	-.23	-2.39**	.27***	.18	1.81*	.10	.12
SDO	-.28***	-.19	-2.04****	.14	.04	-.41	.05	.04	.36
RWA	.01	.05	.41	-.04	.04	-.34	.06	.07	.59
Muslims vs. Christians	-.32***	.29	1.01	.22**	-.46	-1.50	-.05	-.32	-.97
Religious identification	-.06	-.10	-.93	-.03	-.08	-.71	.03	.01	.06
Religious divergence	-.35***	-.66	-1.64*	.27***	.86	2.03**	-.03	.30	.67

Note. *d*f for regressions on Hope factor scores = 104. *d*f for regressions on Fear factor scores = 108. Religious divergence was the interaction of religion, coded -1=Muslim, 1=Christian, and degree of religious identification. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$.

The first factor, fear of further intergroup violence, correlated negatively with identification with the West, with being Christian rather than Muslim, with religious divergence, and with SDO but not with RWA. Regression showed that this fear was particularly acute among those low on SDO and among highly identified Muslims. The degree of identification with the lower-power religious group, rather than just group membership per se, then, was associated with this fear. As in Sample 1, people especially concerned with low-power groups and who are identified with low-powered groups were especially fearful of future intergroup violence. The second fear factor, fear of more war, was felt to the same degree regardless of participants' identification with the West, religious affiliation, religious identification, SDO or RWA. Fear of insecurity, the third factor, was especially acute among those highly identified with the West and among those highly identified as Christians. Given that in recent decades, Lebanon has experienced civil war and has regularly been invaded and attacked by Israel, Syria, and Palestinian militants, and that it borders some of the most heavily armed and conflictual nations on earth, one might expect that all Lebanese have good reason to feel insecure about the relative peace and stability Lebanon is now experiencing. However, these fears were more shared by those groups high in power, perhaps because such groups were targeted on September 11.

The first hope, for humility in U.S. foreign policy, was felt especially by those highly identified as Muslims, low in identification with the West, and those low on SDO. Those especially concerned with groups low in

power held the wish that the most powerful nation on earth would be tempered. One might expect that hoping for an end to the kind of terrorism exhibited on September 11 would be a universal humanitarian issue, but instead those identified with the West and strongly identified as Christians held this hope more. As with the fear of future such attacks, the hope that such attacks will be resolved and ended depended on identification with the kinds of people victimized in these attacks. There was a kind of hope consensually held by the sample, regardless of religious or Western identification or SDO or RWA, namely the hope for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

It was somewhat surprising that the RWA scale predicted none of the hope or fear factors. We have found this RWA scale to predict support for violence against outgroups in Sample 2 (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, under review). As RWA was developed in predominantly Christian cultural contexts, we also tested whether it worked better among more religious people or among Christians than Muslims by computing two additional interaction terms: that between RWA and religious identification, and that between RWA and the contrast coded religious group. Neither of these proved reliable in subsequent regressions. Unlike in Sample 1, then, the fear and hope factor scores created in Sample 2 were independent of authoritarianism.

Discussion

As in Sample 1, those low on SDO particularly feared further violence between various groups around the globe linked to the events of September 11 or American policy made as a consequence of those events. Group identification was also a reliable predictor of fears relating to the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Highly identified Muslims (rather than highly identified Christians) most feared intergroup violence, but highly identified Christians and those identified with the West felt most insecure. This difference in who holds each kind of fear for the future suggest that the Lebanese do not feel they share a common fate with other members of their nation nor indeed with the world. Rather, each sort of fear seems to speak to psychological sensitivity relative to group position: death, local wars, and continued statelessness for Palestinians were feared more by those not identified with dominant groups (Christians and the West), whereas terrorist attacks and financial and travel insecurities were feared more by those identified with dominant groups. Such results caution against the presumption that common experience of trauma necessarily unites communities divided by power distinctions. Indeed, the results of both

Studies 1 and 2 imply that such events will be seen through the views one has on power and might even produce further divides.

Hopes that pertained to a power struggle between the U.S. and the Muslim world were strongly predicted by identification with religious and cultural groups differing in power. Hope for reduced international stature for the U.S. was held by those low in identification with the West, high in Muslim identification, and low on SDO. Hope for punishment of and an end to September 11th-type terrorism was especially held by those highly identified with the West and Christians.

It is important to note that religious group membership alone was not a reliable predictor of hopes or fears in regressions. Rather, the degree of identification with religion in interaction with that religion proved reliable. This implies that Muslims and Christians not strongly identified with their religions did not differ substantially in their fears or hopes. The possibility exists, then, that Muslims and Christians could be united in a common ingroup identity, such as Lebanese national identity or Arab ethnic identity (see Levin et al, in press). In fact, the fear of war centered in or around Lebanon, and the hope for peace for Lebanon's warring neighbors, the Palestinians and Israelis, were felt to the same extent regardless of participants' orientations toward intergroup power.

General Discussion

Comparison of the results from the U.S. and Lebanon inform us what psycho-political reactions are general and which depend on the socio-political context. Generally, we expected that when fears and hopes had a group-interested nature, that they would correspond to SDO and to identification with low or high power groups. The exception was that we did not expect patriotism to correspond to fears or hopes. In contrast, RWA was expected to correspond to personal or group insecurities.

As expected, in both samples people low on SDO and highly identified with low-power groups were more fearful of intergroup violence. Similarly, the hope for international peace (U.S.) and an end to terrorism (Lebanon) were held especially strongly by those who psychologically affiliate with others, though the particular measures of affiliation varied with sample. These findings indicate that similar social-psychological processes were at work among Lebanese and Americans, despite their general differences in power. These results also suggest the importance of research on the psychology of identifying with subordinate rather than just with dominant groups or power-neutral ingroups and outgroups.

As experiments have shown that high SDO people are especially responsive to group threats (Pratto & Shih, 2000), one might expect Americans high on SDO to especially fear loss of U.S. predominance following a direct massive attack on their nation. Instead we found that those high on authoritarianism in the U.S. did. At the time these studies were conducted, Americans high on SDO evidently did not hold the same fear for their national ingroup, perhaps because their tough-minded nature prevents them from feeling threatened in the way that people high on authoritarianism are (Duckitt et al., 2002). There were no comparable fear items with respect to Lebanon, nor had Lebanon been attacked, so this may be why authoritarianism did not relate to any of the hopes and fears in Study 2.

There were two striking differences between Americans and Lebanese. With respect to the fears participants experienced, Americans were more fearful of insecurity concerns than with intergroup violence, whereas Lebanese were much more fearful of intergroup violence than insecurity concerns. This may be because Americans were more proximate to the September 11 attacks. However, it could also represent differences in the political context of Americans and Lebanese. Recall that for the Lebanese, fear for oneself and one's family was included on the insecurity factor, yet this did not make insecurity more of a concern than intergroup violence. It should be remembered that the Lebanese live in a context in which intergroup politics routinely influence life. Whether proximity or other factors influence the prioritization of personal versus political responses to such events could be examined by researchers living in areas likely to be targeted by state- or terrorist violence if they prepare prospective studies.

The other striking contrast between these samples is that the possibility of a loss of U.S. predominance was a *fear* among Americans, but was a *hope* among Lebanese¹. The group positions of participants, then, determined their orientations toward continued U.S. hegemony. Moreover, within each sample, psychological group positions also determined their orientation toward continued U.S. hegemony. Americans concerned about high power groups hoped their country would be restored, united, and their attackers punished with international help. Conversely, Lebanese concerned about low power groups hoped Americans would become more humble and would become more equals to Muslim and Arab leaders.

This suggests that part of the response to September 11 of Lebanese who are sensitized to intergroup inequality was to resent American hegemony, a view widely held by Muslims around the world just months into the U.S. attack on Afghanistan (BBC, 2002), and one that Europeans have largely come to share with the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Pew Research Center,

2003). As terrorist attacks against the U.S. originating from Arab and Muslim nations are showing, this resentment can, when translated into violence, become dangerous to Americans and others. But when attacked, Americans expect a restoration of security with hegemony, which appears likely to breed more resentment and further attacks. The ironic, but from group positions theory, predictable, outcome of such actions and reactions of groups high and low in power is further violent conflict.

In all, then, group positions theory allows one to anticipate at least some reactions to unthinkable and unprecedented political events. Robustly across samples and measures, people whose sympathies lie with high power groups had predictable group- and self-interested fears: loss of in-group stature and fear of personal insecurities. Those sympathetic with high power groups also had predictable group- and self-interested hopes: to right the wrongs done to their ingroups, punish their attackers, and to be personally safe. People whose sympathies lie with low power groups fear the intergroup violence that largely has come to pass and hope for peace. The important questions now are how do people sympathetic with high or low power groups act to allay their fears or to bring about the futures they desire, and what kind of political power does each have to realize their goals?

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¹Reanalysis of the U.S. hopes omitting those not administered in Lebanon could not produce anything like such a factor in the U.S. data.

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